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Introduction
In 2008, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented
1
the Pre-Launch Activities Importation Request (PLAIR) program.
The FDA exercises its enforcement discretion under the guise of the
PLAIR program to permit the importation of unapproved finished
drug products into the United States based on anticipated approval of
a New Drug Application (NDA) or an Abbreviated New Drug
2
In other words, the FDA gives drug
Application (ANDA).
manufacturers permission to import unapproved drugs into the
United States so the manufacturers can expedite their commercial
3
launches when they finally receive official FDA approval.
The FDA developed the PLAIR program with an eye toward
4
the globalization of the pharmaceutical industry. In particular, the
intense competition and relatively small margins in the generic
1. Annual Guidance Agenda, 73 Fed. Reg. 153 (Jul. 30, 2008).
2. Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry on Pre-launch
Activities Importation Requests (PLAIR), at 1 (2013) [hereinafter FDA, PLAIR Draft
Guidance], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM362177.pdf (“Historically, when applicants
sought to import unapproved finished dosage form drug products in preparation for
market launch, FDA considered such requests, informally referred to as Pre-Launch
Activities Importation Requests (PLAIRs), on a case-by-case basis. FDA has decided to
create a more formal program . . . .”).
3. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1; Kurt R. Karst, PLAIRs–
What are They and What are FDA’s Current Policies?, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 11, 2010),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/04/plairs-what-are-they-andwhat-are-fdas-current-policies.html.
4. Karst, supra note 3.
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industry mean that generic companies often must manufacture their
5
drugs in foreign countries where production costs are lower. While
generic companies may be able to produce cheaper goods by
manufacturing in foreign countries, they face additional burdens
when they import their drugs into the United States, a process which
6
is heavily regulated by the FDA. One such burden is seeking PLAIR
approval from the FDA to import a drug prior to FDA marketing
7
But the ability to import unapproved finished drug
approval.
products into the United States ahead of anticipated FDA approval
conflicts with certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that
permit brand-name companies to use permanent injunctions to
prevent the importation of generic equivalents of their drugs before
8
patent expiration.
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc. is the first case under HatchWaxman in which a generic company, notwithstanding a permanent
injunction, has requested to take advantage of the PLAIR program to
import a generic drug into the United States before the expiration of
9
the pioneer’s patent. Although arguments were made on both sides
regarding whether Apotex should be allowed to take advantage of the
PLAIR program despite the permanent injunction, Sanofi v. Apotex
was dismissed for not being timely, and neither the District Court nor
the Federal Circuit addressed the conflict between PLAIR and
10
However, it is likely that more generic
Hatch-Waxman.
manufacturers will attempt to take advantage of the PLAIR program

5. Compare World Health Organization, Pharmaceutical Industry, http://www.who.
int/trade/glossary/story073/en/ (noting that some of the largest pharmaceutical companies
have profit margins of about 30%) with THE HENRY FUND, GENERIC DRUG
MANUFACTURERS (2013), http://tippie.uiowa.edu/henry/reports13/generics.pdf (showing
that the profit margins for the five largest generic manufacturers range from 0.89% to
18.93%). See also Christelle Laot, FedEx and Generic Drugs: Connecting Global
Manufacturers to Consumer Markets, FEDEX BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011), http://blog.fedex.
designcdt.com/generic-drugs-markets.
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
7. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2012).
9. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., (nonprecedential order) 1, 2 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
10. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5-6, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No.
1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012); see also Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 3-6,
8-9 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012);
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., (nonprecedential order) 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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to overcome injunctions and import their drugs prior to FDA
11
marketing approval.
This Article analyzes the conflict between the PLAIR program
and the Hatch-Waxman Act and discusses solutions to the conflict.
Part 1 of this Article provides an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the regulation of generic drugs. Part 2 provides an overview of
the PLAIR program. Part 3 analyzes the validity of the PLAIR
program. Part 4 analyzes the conflict between the PLAIR program
and the Hatch-Waxman Act and provides a description of the Sanofi
v. Apotex case. Part 5 discusses balancing the goals of the PLAIR
program with the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part 6 discusses
modifying the current regulatory regime to resolve the conflict
between the PLAIR program and the Hatch-Waxman Act. Finally,
Part 7 provides strategic considerations for practitioners in this area.

1. Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the Regulation of Generic Drugs
1.1. The Regulation of Drugs Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

In order to market a new drug, or to import it for marketing, a
12
pharmaceutical company must first obtain FDA approval. Section
355(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provides that
“[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is
13
effective with respect to such drug.” Because section 355(a) only
prohibits importation of finished drug products (i.e., products that are
ready for sale), the FDA has long allowed the importation of
unfinished drug products into the United States, and has issued
specific regulations to permit the importation of unfinished bulk
14
products ahead of FDA approval. Unfinished bulk products can
undergo further manufacturing, processing, and repackaging in the
United States prior to regulatory approval, so the finished drug
product will be ready for an immediate market launch when the FDA

11. Kurt R. Karst, FDA’s PLAIR Program Collides with Hatch-Waxman, FDA LAW
BLOG (May 23, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/
05/fdas-plair-program-collides-with-hatch-waxman.html.
12. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
14. 21 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) (2008) (“A drug substance intended for use in the
manufacture, processing, or repacking of a new drug may be imported into the United
States if it complies with the labeling exemption in § 201.122 pertaining to shipments of
drug substances in domestic commerce.”).
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15

finally grants approval.
While FDA regulations allow the
importation of unfinished bulk products, no such regulations exist for
finished drug products. Consequently, finished drug products cannot
be imported into the United States ahead of FDA approval, and
therefore, will not be ready for market launch upon regulatory
approval. This effectively places generic companies that manufacture
in foreign countries at a competitive disadvantage to those who
16
manufacture generics domestically.
Despite the absence of such regulations, the FDA has
historically exercised enforcement discretion to permit the
importation of finished drug products into the United States ahead of
17
anticipated FDA approval. As the authority for this enforcement
18
discretion, the FDA has cited section 336 of the FDCA, which
provides that the FDA is not required “to report for prosecution, or
for the institution of . . . injunction proceedings, minor violations . . .
whenever [it] believes that the public interest will be adequately
19
served . . . .” By allowing preapproval importation, the FDA seeks
to promote competition and lower prices of drugs as quickly as
20
possible.
1.2. The Regulation of Generic Drugs Under the Hatch-Waxman Act

Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman
Act, to amend section 355(j) of the FDCA and section 271(e) of the
Patent Act to create the statutory scheme to regulate the modern
21
generic pharmaceutical industry. The intent of Hatch-Waxman was
to “strike a balance between ‘two conflicting policy objectives: to
induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments
necessary to research and develop new drug products, while

15. 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c) (2012) (“A new drug application . . . has been submitted
but not yet approved, disapproved, granted, or denied, the bulk drug is not exported, and
the finished drug product is not further distributed after it is manufactured until after the
new drug application . . . is approved . . . .”).
16. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that domestic
manufacturers may also be at a disadvantage, since they likely cannot even begin to
manufacture their generic products until the pioneer’s patent expires.
17. Karst, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (emphasis added); see also Karst, supra note 3.
20. E-mail from Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP, to
Author (Feb. 18, 2014, 08:40 PST) (on file with author).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
355(j) (2012), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2012)).
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simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies
22
of those drugs to market.’”
In order to enable competitors to bring generic copies of
pioneer drugs to market, Hatch-Waxman provides for an
23
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).
An ANDA
applicant is only required to provide proof that its generic copy of the
pioneer drug: (1) has the same active ingredient and the basic
pharmacokinetics as the pioneer drug, (2) is bioequivalent to the
pioneer drug and (3) the dosage form and strength of the pioneer and
24
generic are the same. However, unlike drug pioneers, an ANDA
applicant is not required to provide independent proof of either the
safety or the efficacy of the generic copy, and instead can rely on the
25
clinical trial data of the pioneer drug.
An ANDA applicant must make one of the following
certifications with respect to each patent which claims the pioneer
drug that it seeks to copy: (I) the drug is not patented or the patent
information has not been filed; (II) the patent has expired; (III) the
date when the patent expires and that the generic drug will not go on
the market until that date passes; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic
26
drug.
Patent challenges pursuant to Paragraph IV are a frequently
deployed mechanism for the early introduction of generic
27
competition. When an applicant files an ANDA with Paragraph IV
certification, two features of Hatch-Waxman apply: (1) thirty-month
stay, and (2) 180-day marketing exclusivity. In addition, if the
pioneer successfully sues the Paragraph IV challenger for patent
infringement, then the Act allows the pioneer to get a permanent
injunction against the generic challenger.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002).
H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (July 2002) (reporting challenges involving 130 drugs
between 1984 and 2000); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act” Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 117
(2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, FTC) (noting challenges involving more
than eighty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003).
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1.2.1. Thirty-Month Stay

The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides that making a Paragraph
28
IV certification is itself an act of patent infringement. An applicant
who files an ANDA with Paragraph IV certification must provide
29
notice of the ANDA to the patent holder. After receiving such
notice, the NDA holder has forty-five days to bring an infringement
30
action against the ANDA applicant. If suit is not filed within that
31
time, then the FDA can approve the ANDA immediately. But if
suit is brought during that time, then FDA is barred from approving
32
the ANDA for thirty months.
During the thirty-month stay, the FDA can only “tentatively
approve” the ANDA, such that the ANDA can become effective
33
immediately upon the expiration of the thirty-month stay.
The
exceptions to the thirty-month stay are if either: (1) the patent
expires, or (2) the district court finds that the patent is invalid or is
not infringed during the thirty-month stay. In either case, the ANDA
34
can be approved immediately.
1.2.2. 180-Day Marketing Exclusivity

The statute provides that the first applicant to file a Paragraph
IV ANDA with the FDA will be granted 180 days of market
35
exclusivity upon entering the market with their generic equivalent.
The FDA is barred from approving later-filed ANDAs for the same
drug until 180 days after the first filer begins marketing its generic
36
copy of the pioneer drug.
The purpose of 180-day marketing
exclusivity is to encourage Paragraph IV challenges by rewarding the
first filer: “[i]n exchange for undertaking the costs and risks of patent
litigation, the successful challenger is given [six] months of marketing
37
without any other generic competition.” This marketing exclusivity

28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . an
[ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent . . . .”).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
36. Id.
37. Representative Henry Waxman, Speech at the Generic Pharmaceutical
Association’s First Annual Policy Conference: Securing the Future of Affordable Medicine

Summer 2014]

CONFLICT BETWEEN PLAIR AND HATCH-WAXMAN

97

period is valuable to generic companies because they can sell their
generic drugs at a price significantly higher than if multiple generic
38
drugs were on the market.
1.2.3. Permanent Injunction

Section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, which was added as part of
the Hatch-Waxman amendments, allows courts to order the FDA to
delay ANDA approval until a patent expires and to grant an
injunction to prevent the manufacture, use, sale, or importation of a
39
drug. A patent holder is entitled to a permanent injunction pursuant
to section 271(e)(4) if: (1) the patent holder brings an infringement
action, and (2) the district court finds that the patent is both valid and
40
infringed. But Hatch-Waxman does not include any provisions that
allow for a permanent injunction to be ignored for pre-launch
importation purposes. And because the injunction provisions are part
of the Patent Act, the FDA does not have discretion to interpret or
41
enforce these injunctions.

2. Overview of PLAIR Program
2.1. Pre-Launch Importation of Drugs Before the PLAIR Program

The FDA has long allowed drug manufacturers to import
unfinished bulk products into the United States ahead of FDA
42
approval. Despite Section 355(a) of the FDCA, the FDA has issued
regulations to permit the importation of unfinished bulk products into
(Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/news_files/news_statements_
generic_pharmaceutical%20_association_9.20.05.htm.
38. Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 178 n.56
(2008) (“For example, when generic Prozac (Fluoxetine) entered the market, the first
generic challenger sold it at $1.91/capsule, or 12% below the cost of brand-name Prozac.
Two months after the exclusivity period expired, multiple generics had entered the market
and the price of generic Prozac had dropped to $0.32/capsule.”).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (“For an act of infringement [caused by filing a Paragraph
IV ANDA] (A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug . . . to
be a date which is not earlier than the date of the expiration of the patent which has been
infringed, (B) injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent the
commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation
into the United States of an approved drug, veterinary biological product, or biological
product. . . .”).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
41. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000); see also
discussion infra Part 3.3.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); 21 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c)
(2012).
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43

the United States ahead of regulatory approval. The only restriction
on such importation is that the label of a drug in a bulk package must
bear the statements “Caution: For manufacturing, processing, or
44
repacking” and “Rx only.” These unfinished bulk products can then
undergo further processing in the United States.
However, despite the absence of such regulations for the
importation of finished drug products into the United States ahead of
FDA approval, the Agency has historically exercised enforcement
45
discretion to also permit such importation.
But this historical
enforcement discretion was exercised informally and there is no
46
record of how it was used by the FDA.
2.2. The PLAIR Program

In 2008, the FDA launched the PLAIR program by issuing
guidance documents describing its policy for exercising enforcement
discretion with respect to the importation of unapproved drugs into
47
the United States. PLAIR formalizes the FDA’s historical exercise
of enforcement discretion to permit the importation of finished drug
48
products into the United States ahead of anticipated FDA approval.
Based on a PLAIR request, the FDA will decide on a case-bycase basis whether to permit importation of unapproved finished drug
49
products. An applicant should make a PLAIR request no more than
two months prior to its expected launch date, but at least one month
prior to the expected importation to allow the Agency time to process
50
the request. A PLAIR applicant is required to submit, among other
things, information on: (1) the drug product name, and (2) the
warehouse in United States where it will be stored pending FDA

43. 21 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c) (2012).
44. 21 C.F.R. § 201.122 (2012).
45. Karst, supra note 2.
46. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1 (“Historically, when
applicants sought to import unapproved finished dosage form drug products in
preparation for market launch, FDA considered such requests, informally referred to as
Pre-Launch Activities Importation Requests (PLAIRs), on a case-by-case basis.”)
47. Annual Guidance Agenda, 73 Fed. Reg. 153 (July 30, 2008); see also
REGULATIONS.GOV (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (The FDA published its annual guidance
agenda, which included a notice that it was planning to publish a guidance document for
the PLAIR program. No comments were submitted by the public in response to this
agenda.), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2004-N-0056-0003.
48. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1; see also Karst, supra note 3.
49. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1.
50. Id. at 4-5.
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51

approval. In addition, a PLAIR applicant must also submit a letter
signed by an authorized representative certifying that it will not sell
52
the finished drug product before receiving regulatory approval.
Notably, the PLAIR applicant does not need to submit any
information identifying injunctions that may prohibit the applicant
from importing the finished drug product.
The Agency has
previously stated that it will respond to a PLAIR request within two
53
weeks, however the current draft guidance does not specify how
long the Agency will take to respond. If the FDA approves the
request, then the applicant may immediately begin importing the
54
finished drug product, notwithstanding any injunctions.

3. Validity of the PLAIR Program
Because there is no explicit statutory basis for the PLAIR
program, it is unclear whether the FDA has the legal authority to
allow the importation of unapproved finished drug products. The
constitutional validity of the PLAIR program and the FDA’s ability
to exercise enforcement discretion under the FDCA are discussed in
more detail below. In short, the FDA has the authority to regulate
the importation of drugs into the United States and the right to
exercise enforcement discretion to not prosecute a violation of
section 355(a) of the FDCA. However, that authority is limited to the
extent that the importation of finished drug products is not subject to
restrictions by other regulatory schemes, including the Patent Act,
outside the control of the FDA.
3.1. Constitutional Validity Under Chevron v. NRDC

The scope and extent of a federal agency’s authority is limited
55
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
by Congress.
provides that a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an

51. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2-4.
52. Id. at 3-4.
53. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PRE-LAUNCH ACTIVITIES IMPORTATION
REQUEST (PLAIR) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1, 2 (July 2013)
[hereinafter FDA, PLAIR FAQ], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ImportsandExportsCompliance/UCM297
907.pdf.
54. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 5-6.
55. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” When
an agency acts in a way that is allegedly arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the reviewing
court must evaluate the agency’s actions using the two-step analysis
described in Chevron v. NRDC. First, the court must review the
agency’s authorizing statute de novo to determine “[i]f the intent of
57
Congress is clear.” If Congress clearly intended to allow the agency
to act in the way challenged, then the challenge must be rejected and
58
the action allowed. However, if Congress did not clearly intend to
allow the agency to so act, then the court should only defer to the
agency when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law (e.g., if the
agency has the power to engage in notice-and-comment
59
rulemaking).
Section 355(a) of the FDCA requires a pharmaceutical
company to first obtain FDA approval in order to market, or to
60
import to market, a new drug. However, section 336 of the FDCA
permits the FDA to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to
“minor violations” of the FDCA if the “public interest will be
61
adequately served.” As discussed in Part 1.1 above, the FDA has
historically exercised enforcement discretion to permit the
importation of finished drug products into the United States ahead of
anticipated FDA approval, classifying these preapproval importations

56. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall—(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . In making the foregoing determinations, the
court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
58. Id. at 842-43.
59. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law . . . Delegation of such authority may be shown . . . by an agency’s power
to engage in . . . notice-and-comment rulemaking.”).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.”).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the
Secretary to report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel or injunction proceedings,
minor violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the public interest will be
adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.”).
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as “minor violations.” However, Congress failed to define what
constitutes “minor violations” or the “public interest,” and therefore,
it is not at all clear how far the Agency’s enforcement discretion
extends under Section 336 of the FDCA.
As required by the Administrative Procedure Act, the FDA
has engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking with respect to its
regulations that permit the importation of unfinished bulk products
63
into the United States ahead of FDA approval. Under the second
step described in Chevron, if a reviewing court determines that
Congress delegated authority to the FDA generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and “if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
64
statute.” As such, because the statute is ambiguous with respect to
the scope of “minor violations,” the FDA’s regulations interpreting
the FDCA to allow for preapproval importation of unfinished bulk
product are valid and should be given deference by a reviewing court.
However, with respect to the importation of finished bulk
product, the Agency has issued no regulations. And the FDCA is not
silent with respect to the issue of the importation of new drugs—
section 355(a) is quite explicit that marketing approval is needed
65
before a sponsor may import new drugs into the country.
Section 355 of the FDCA was intended to ensure the safety and
66
efficacy of new drugs. For example, section 355(b)(1) of the FDCA
provides that an NDA or ANDA applicant is required to submit
information, including “full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether
67
such drug is effective in use . . . .” While the PLAIR program
permits the importation of finished drug products into the United

62. Karst, supra note 3.
63. 1 C.F.R. § 314.410(a)(2) ; 21 C.F.R. § 201.122(c).
64. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
66. Richard S. Fortunato, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data: The Scope of
Section 301(j), 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280 n.2-3 (1984) (“A new drug” is defined as a drug
whose composition is not generally recognized “as safe and effective for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling,” or a drug whose
composition has been so recognized as a result of investigations, but which has not “been
used to a material extent or for a material time.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982). . . . The Act
provides that no person shall introduce into interstate commerce any new drug without
premarket approval from the Secretary of Health and Human Services certifying that the
drug is safe and effective for use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b) (1982)”).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
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States ahead of anticipated FDA approval, a pharmaceutical
company is still prohibited from marketing its new drug ahead of
68
actual FDA approval. If the FDA does not grant approval, then a
pharmaceutical company risks having to destroy or export its
69
The PLAIR program still prohibits pharmaceutical
inventory.
companies from marketing new drugs without actual FDA approval,
so that even if a drug has been imported, the public is still protected
from consuming potentially unsafe or ineffective drugs.
Consequently, because the intent of the FDCA is to protect the
public health by ensuring citizens are not exposed to adulterated or
70
misbranded drugs, and because the PLAIR program still prevents
such exposure, it is not, at the very least, arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion under a Chevron analysis.
However, as previously noted, section 271(e)(4) of the Patent
Act allows an NDA holder that has prevailed in a patent litigation to
obtain a permanent injunction against a generic challenger to prevent
71
it from importing its infringing drug product.
These injunctions
seem absolute—there is no exception allowing the FDA or anyone
else to disregard a permanent injunction for public interest reasons or
otherwise.
The Patent Act does not include a provision
corresponding to section 336 of the FDCA granting enforcement
discretion. Even if there were such a provision, it would likely apply
to the agency having general authority over the Patent Act, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, not the FDA, which has
no authority to interpret the Patent Act, and thus has no authority to
issue regulations regarding permanent injunctions obtained under
section 271(e)(4). Because the intent of Congress with respect to
section 271(e)(4) seems clear, and because the FDA has no authority
to say otherwise, courts performing a Chevron analysis should hold as
unlawful and set aside any FDA action under the PLAIR program
that would allow importation of an infringing drug product in
violation of a permanent injunction. But if there are no permanent
injunctions prohibiting importation, then per the second step of the
Chevron analysis courts should defer to the FDA’s decision to allow
preapproval importation as a “minor violation” of section 355(a) of
the FDCA.

68. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2.
69. Id. at 6 (“the finished dosage form drug product should be exported or destroyed
within 90 days of the refusal”); Laot, supra note 5.
70. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).
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3.2. Prosecutorial Discretion

Although PLAIR allows for the type of behavior that both
section 355(a) of the FDCA and section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act
prohibit, it is important to distinguish between lawful and unlawful
activity. PLAIR does not declare the importation of finished drug
products into the United States ahead of anticipated FDA approval
to be lawful. When the FDA grants a PLAIR request, the Agency is
simply exercising its enforcement discretion to not prosecute a
violation of section 355(a) of the FDCA. But it is also important to
highlight that the FDA’s determination to not prosecute an unlawful
72
activity is well within its discretion.
In the landmark case on prosecutorial discretion, Heckler v.
Chaney, the Supreme Court affirmed the FDA’s right to determine
73
for itself how to enforce the FDCA. For practical reasons, the FDA
74
cannot act against each technical violation of the FDCA. An agency
decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a
number of factors that are peculiarly within its expertise, including:
(1) whether a violation has occurred, (2) whether the agency has
sufficient resources to take action, (3) whether prosecuting the
violation is an efficient use of agency resources, (4) whether the
agency is likely to succeed if it acts, and (5) whether taking action
75
aligns with the Agency’s overall policies.
The Heckler court
reasoned that the FDA is far better equipped than the courts to deal
with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its
76
priorities.
The Supreme Court subsequently reiterated in Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs Legal Committee that the FDA has “complete discretion” to
decide how and when to enforce the FDCA, and must exercise its
77
prosecutorial discretion to balance statutory objectives.
The
Buckman decision suggests that the FDA essentially has unlimited

72. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal
Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 348-49 (2001).
73. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837-38 (“The general exception to reviewability provided by
[the Administrative Procure Act] § 701(a)(2) for action “committed to agency discretion”
remains a narrow one . . . but within that exception are included agency refusals to
institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated
otherwise. In so holding, we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the
decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially
reviewable.”).
74. Id. at 831.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 831-32.
77. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348.
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discretion to prosecute or excuse violations of the FDCA as it sees
78
fit. Notwithstanding Heckler and Buckman, a recent decision from
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shows that the
FDA’s enforcement discretion is not be entirely shielded from
79
judicial review. In Cook v. Food and Drug Administration, the D.C.
Circuit held that where there are clear statutory guidelines for the
FDA to follow in exercising its enforcement discretion, the FDA’s
compliance with such guidelines is subject to judicial review under the
80
Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, Cook suggests that,
because section 355(a) clearly prohibits importation of finished drug
products “unless an approval of an application . . . is effective with
respect to such drug,” the FDA’s decision not to prosecute violations
of section 355(a)—as it does under PLAIR—may be subject to
81
judicial review. However, even if allowing preapproval importation
under PLAIR is subject to judicial review, the Agency’s allowance of
such importations is not necessarily an abuse of discretion.
In light of Heckler and Buckman, the PLAIR program’s
allowance for “minor violations” of section 355(a) to permit the
importation of finished drug products ahead of anticipated FDA
approval is consistent with the scope of the Agency’s enforcement
discretion. Furthermore, even if the PLAIR program is subject to
judicial review under Cook, allowing for preapproval importations is
likely not an abuse of the FDA’s prosecutorial discretion. Note,
however, that this allowance is limited to the extent that the
importation of finished drug products is not subject to restrictions by
other regulatory schemes, including injunctions under the Patent Act,
outside the control of the FDA.
3.3. Authority to Regulate

In a modern case on the scope of the FDA’s regulatory power,
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court held
that where Congress enacts a regulatory scheme outside the control
82
of the FDA, the Agency may not regulate that area. The power of
the FDA to regulate must always be grounded in a valid grant of

78. James M. Beck et al., Don’t Forget FDA Prosecutorial Discretion, DRUG AND
DEVICE LAW (Oct. 5, 2012), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2012/10/dont-forgetfda-prosecutorial-discretion.html.
79. See Cook v. Food & Drug Admin., 733 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
80. Id.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); see Cook, 733 F.3d at 10.
82. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161.

Summer 2014]

CONFLICT BETWEEN PLAIR AND HATCH-WAXMAN

105

83

authority from Congress.
In other words, the FDA may only
regulate in areas specified by its authorizing statute.
The FDCA grants the Agency the authority to regulate, among
84
other things, drugs and devices. In particular, pursuant to section
355(a), the FDA possesses the authority to regulate the importation
85
of drugs into the United States. However, such authority to regulate
must be squared with the fact that the importation of drugs into the
United States might also be subject to regulation by other regulatory
schemes outside the control of the FDA, such as the Patent Act.
Under the Patent Act, the power to regulate patents is granted
86
to the Secretary of Commerce. The FDA is not granted any general
authority with respect to the Patent Act. However, the Patent Act
does grant the FDA authority to do one thing—the FDA has the
power to determine the period of extension of patent terms for drugs,
87
devices, and additives that are subject to regulation by the FDCA.
There is no evidence that Congress intended to authorize the
FDA to regulate patent-related issues beyond the specifically recited
power to determine the period of extension of patent term for the
limited class of items. Therefore, if a generic drug is subject to a
permanent injunction pursuant to section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act,
it is not eligible for pre-launch importation. The FDA cannot ignore
the statutory mandate of the Patent Act.
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that, subject
to the limitations discussed above, PLAIR is a valid regulatory
program. The FDA has the authority to regulate the importation of
drugs into the United States and the right to exercise enforcement
discretion to not prosecute a violation of section 355(a) of the FDCA.
However, that authority is limited to the extent that the importation
of finished drug products is not subject to restrictions by other
regulatory schemes, including the Patent Act, that are outside the
control of the FDA.

83. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161.
84. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321(g)-(h), 393.
85. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a).
87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(c)(d)(1)(C), 156(c)(4)(d)(2)(A)(ii)-(B)(ii) (“The term of a
patent eligible for extension . . . shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory
review period for the approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is
issued”).
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4. The Conflict Between the PLAIR Program and the
Hatch-Waxman Act
4.1. The Conflict

When the FDA grants a PLAIR request, it does not declare
the importation to be lawful—instead, the Agency simply exercises its
enforcement discretion to not prosecute a violation of section 355(a)
of the FDCA. However, importation under PLAIR may nevertheless
violate a permanent injunction granted pursuant to section 271(e)(4)
of the Patent Act, which was added as part of the Hatch-Waxman
88
amendments.
Regardless of whether the FDA chooses not to
prosecute a violation of section 355(a), it has no power to abrogate
89
the Patent Act amendments added by Hatch-Waxman.
If a generic company files an ANDA with a Paragraph IV
certification, the brand-name company can respond by bringing an
90
infringement action within forty-five days.
If the brand-name
company does not file suit within that time, then the FDA can
91
approve the ANDA immediately. Here, there is no conflict between
PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman since the brand-name company never
asserted its patent rights, and thus the generic company can take
advantage of an approved PLAIR request to import its generic drug
ahead of anticipated ANDA approval.
However, if the brand-name company files suit within that
time, then the FDA is barred from approving the ANDA until the
92
expiration of a thirty-month stay. The only exceptions to the thirty-

88. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012), 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271(e) (2012)).
89. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 120. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article, there is an alternative argument that the FDA has authority to
abrogate injunctions issued under section 271(e)(4) by virtue of its authority to regulate all
aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hatch-Waxman was created as a tool to allow the
FDA to regulate generic drug marketing. Even though the permanent injunction
provision of section 271(e)(4) was inserted into the Patent Act, by virtue of originating
from Hatch-Waxman, the FDA may be able to abrogate permanent injunctions granted by
271(e)(4) by virtue of its arguable authority to regulate all aspects of the Hatch-Waxman
Act (regardless of whether the amendments ended up in Title 21 or 35). Thus, generic
manufacturers could use a PLAIR request to overcome an injunction under 271(e)(4) to
import prior to final ANDA approval. However, if an injunction is issued under 271(a)
(i.e., during a typical patent infringement action), then a PLAIR request could not be used
to allow importation during the term of the injunction.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd).
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month stay are if the patent expires, or if the district court finds that
the patent is either invalid or not infringed, at which point the FDA
93
can approve the ANDA immediately. If one of these exceptions
occurs, there is again no conflict between PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman
since the brand-name company has no valid patent rights to assert
against the ANDA filer. In this case, the generic company can take
advantage of an approved PLAIR request to import its generic drug
ahead of anticipated ANDA approval.
The conflict between PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman arises only
94
when a district court finds that the patent is both valid and infringed.
In this case, the FDA cannot approve the ANDA until the patent
95
expires. Furthermore, the brand-name company is entitled to seek a
permanent injunction against the generic pursuant to section
271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, which can be used to stop the generic
company from importing its infringing drug product before the date
96
that the patent expires.
Therefore, under Hatch-Waxman, the
generic company should not be able to take advantage of PLAIR to
import its generic drug into the United States ahead of anticipated
97
ANDA approval.
The problem with the PLAIR program is that it does not
consider the Hatch-Waxman Act, notwithstanding the fact that
Hatch-Waxman essentially serves as the statutory basis for regulating
98
the entire generic pharmaceutical industry.
Under the PLAIR
program, a generic company could theoretically import its generic
drug ahead of anticipated ANDA approval, regardless of whether
99
there is a permanent injunction barring such importation. This is
precisely what occurred in Sanofi v. Apotex, discussed below, where

93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV).
94. Note that the conflict also likely only arises when the generic challenger is the
first Paragraph IV ANDA filer. Later filers typically cannot launch their products until
after the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period has expired. Depending on when the first
filer begins marketing its generic drug, later filers have at a minimum 180 days after the
patent expires to import their generic drugs. Since the patent has expired, later filers who
take advantage of PLAIR to import during the 180-day exclusivity period to be ready to
launch when the 180-day exclusivity period expires will not conflict with section 271(e)(4)
of the Patent Act.
95. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
96. Id.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B).
98. See FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2.
99. Id.
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the FDA did not consider a prior permanent injunction and approved
100
the PLAIR request.
4.2. Sanofi v. Apotex

Sanofi v. Apotex is the first Hatch-Waxman case in which the
conflict with the PLAIR program has been raised as an issue. SanofiSynthelabo (Sanofi) is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 4,847,265 (the
’265 patent), which expired on November 17, 2011, with a period of
101
pediatric exclusivity that expired on May 17, 2012. The ’265 patent
covers Plavix (clopidogrel bisulfate), a blockbuster drug used to treat
102
heart attacks and strokes.
On November 16, 2001, Apotex filed an ANDA for Plavix that
103
Since
included a Paragraph IV certification against ’265 patent.
Apotex was the first applicant to file a Paragraph IV ANDA, it was
entitled to 180 days of marketing exclusivity against later-filing
104
applicants.
In response to the ANDA filing, Sanofi brought an
infringement action against Apotex in the District Court for the
105
Southern District of New York in March 2002. More than five years
later, the Court held that the ’265 patent was both valid and infringed,
and that Sanofi was entitled to a permanent injunction against
106
Apotex per section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act. In December 2008,
107
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
In January 2006, while the infringement action was still
108
pending in the District Court, the FDA approved the ANDA.
Before the District Court could render its decision on the validity of
the ’265 patent, Apotex initiated an at-risk launch on August 8, 2006,
109
(which also triggered the start of its 180-day exclusivity period).

100. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No.
1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012).
101. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 357.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 397.
107. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F. 3d 1075, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
108. Apotex clopidogrel at-risk launch costs US$442 million, GABI ONLINE – GENERIC
AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/
News/Apotex-clopidogrel-at-risk-launch-costs-US-442-million; Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F.
Supp. 2d at 357.
109. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) aff’d
sub nom. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On August 8,
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However, just three weeks later, the District Court issued a
preliminary injunction ordering Apotex to stop its sales of generic
Plavix (and subsequently issued a permanent injunction, as
110
mentioned above).
Then in April 2012, notwithstanding the permanent injunction,
Apotex filed a PLAIR request with the FDA to import its generic
product ahead of anticipated ANDA approval on May 17, 2012,
111
which was the date of the expiration of the ‘265 patent. On May 7,
112
2012, the FDA approved the PLAIR request.
Just a few days before the PLAIR request was approved by the
FDA, Apotex filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(6) to
amend the 2007 permanent injunction to include the underlined text:
[Apotex is] hereby permanently enjoined from engaging in the
commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell or sale within the
United States, or importation into the United States of drug
products as claimed in [the ‘265 patent], until the expiration of
[the ‘265 patent] and any period of pediatric exclusivity that
may be granted, except for importation by Apotex to its own
warehouse facilities prior to the expiration of the pediatric
exclusivity period to the extent such importation is permitted by
[the FDA] pursuant to a [PLAIR request] made by Apotex and
113
granted by the FDA.
Apotex argued that because it initiated an at-risk launch and
forfeited its 180-day marketing exclusivity, it must be permitted to
take advantage of PLAIR so as not to be placed at a competitive
114
disadvantage. Other manufacturers of generic Plavix would be able
to use the PLAIR program to import their products ahead of

2006, Apotex initiated an at-risk launch of its generic product, in advance of a
determination on the merits of its invalidity defense against the ‘265. Id. Sanofi moved
for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Apotex from distributing its generic product. Id.
On August 31, 2006, the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a
preliminary injunction, but denied a recall on the approximately six-month supply of
generic product that had already been shipped to distributors in the United States. Id.
110. GABI ONLINE – GENERIC AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE, supra note 108. Note
that by launching at-risk, Apotex triggered the start of its 180-day exclusivity period, but
then lost the benefit of the exclusivity period when it was enjoined shortly thereafter.
Sanofi-Synthelabo, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 344-45. However, this was a small loss, since when
Apotex lost in litigation it was forced to amend its Paragraph IV certification to a
Paragraph III certification, which would have caused an immediate forfeiture under 35
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(III).
111. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 2012-1383 (Fed. Cir. May 15, 2012) (order
denying motion).
112. Id.
113. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012) (emphasis in original).
114. Id.
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anticipated ANDA approval, and therefore Apotex’s competitors
would be ready to launch the minute after Sanofi’s exclusivity expired
115
on May 17, 2012. In contrast, the permanent injunction would bar
116
Apotex from even importing its generic product until May 17, 2012.
Because the first-mover advantage is critical in generic drug sales,
even the slight marketing delay caused by the permanent injunction
would unfairly present Apotex with “extreme and undue hardship.”
On May 10, 2012, the District Court denied Apotex’s motion to
amend the 2007 permanent injunction, holding that the five-year
117
delay in bringing the motion was not reasonable.
Unfortunately,
the District Court did not address whether the proposed amendment
to allow importation under PLAIR would have been granted if it had
been brought in a timely manner. A few days later, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, also without addressing the
118
substance of the proposed amendment. Then on May 18, 2012, the
day Sanofi’s exclusivity expired, the FDA approved the ANDAs of
119
Apotex’s competitors
Apotex and six other generic companies.
120
were able to immediately launch their generic products. Although
Apotex also launched its own generic version of Plavix, as evidenced
by the fact that it is currently marketing the product in the United
States, the company has not publicized the specific date on which it
121
launched its version following the FDA’s en masse approval.
The Sanofi case shows how conflict between the HatchWaxman Act and the PLAIR program stems from the fact that the
FDA and the courts are enforcing two different sets of rules. The
policies of the PLAIR program only require the FDA to review a
limited set of information, which does not include possible injunctions

115. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012).
116. Id. at 5-6.
117. Sanofi-Synthelabo, No. 2012-1383 (order denying motion).
118. Id.
119. Drug In Focus April 2012: Clopidogrel, GENERICSWEB (Apr. 2012),
http://www.genericsweb.com/download/DIF%20Clopidogrel.pdf. The six other generic
companies were Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co., Mylan Inc.,
Roxane Laboratories, Inc., Sun Pharma USA, and Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
120. Dr Reddy's Laboratories, Mylan Launch Clopidogrel Tablets in US Market,
ECONOMIC TIMES (May 18, 2012), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-0518/news/31765607_1_paragraph-iv-tablets-generic-version.
121. Clopidogrel Tablets USP, 75MG, 30 TABLET (BOTTLE) - Apotex Products:
United States, APOTEX CORP., http://www.apotex.com/us/en/products/detail.asp?m=45969
(last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
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122

against the requester. In Sanofi v. Apotex, Apotex did not submit
information on the permanent injunction against it, and the FDA
123
presumably was not aware of it when approving the PLAIR request.
The courts, in contrast, refused to allow Apotex to insert PLAIRrelated language into the permanent injunction. As shown in Sanofi,
the courts reviewed the entire record before it, which included the
124
2007 permanent injunction.
Because the courts did not address the substance of Apotex’s
motion, we do not know whether a court would allow a permanent
injunction issued under section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act to be
abrogated by a PLAIR request. However, as discussed in Part 3,
supra, while the FDA has the authority to regulate the importation of
drugs into the United States and the right to allow preapproval
importation via the PLAIR program, the Agency does not have any
authority to regulate with respect to the Patent Act. As such, the
courts should not allow PLAIR-based importations during the
pendency of a permanent injunction.

5. The PLAIR Program and the Intent of the Hatch-Waxman
Act
The goal of the PLAIR program is to allow pharmaceutical
companies to import unapproved finished drug products in
125
preparation for market launch. Here we discuss how this goal does
not conflict with the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which is to
strike a balance between conflicting policy objectives—enabling
generic companies to bring low-cost drugs to the market while
maintaining incentives for pioneers to develop and launch innovative
126
new drugs.
These objectives are reflected in the two parts of the
Hatch-Waxman Act: Title I, the Drug Price Competition Act, which
amended section 355 of the FDCA, and Title II, the Patent Term
127
Restoration Act, which amended section 271 of the Patent Act.
The intent of each part is separate and distinct, and therefore, the

122. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1.
123. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No.
1:02-cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012). Interestingly, even if the FDA were aware of
the permanent injunction, it is not clear that this would have had any effect on its decision
to approve Apotex’s PLAIR request.
124. Sanofi-Synthelabo, No. 2012-1383 (order denying motion).
125. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2-3.
126. aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 230; Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. I, at 14-15 (1984).
127. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 20; pt. 1, at 37.
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PLAIR program and its effects will be discussed in the context of
128
Title I and Title II in Parts 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
5.1. Title I and Making Generic Drugs Available to the Public

The intent of the Drug Price Competition Act is to make more
129
generic drugs available to the public. It is in the public interest that
generic drug manufacturers bring their products to market as soon as
possible because the price of generic drugs is significantly discounted
130
from the price of brand-name drugs. In addition, it is in the public
interest that there be as many generic competitors in the marketplace
as possible, since the more generic competitors there are in the
131
marketplace, the cheaper the generic drugs become.
The PLAIR
program aligns with the intent of Title I by helping generic
132
manufacturers expedite the commercial launch of their products.
As such, from this policy standpoint, Apotex arguably should have
been permitted to take advantage of its approved PLAIR request.
As discussed in Part 1.2, supra, the Hatch-Waxman Act
primarily helps bring generics to market via the ANDA process,
which most notably allows generic competitors to use Paragraph IV
certifications to seek market entry prior to the expiration of the
133
patents covering the brand-name drug.
Additionally, in order to
encourage Paragraph IV challenges, Hatch-Waxman provides that
the first applicant to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification
will be granted 180 days of market exclusivity upon market launch, in

128. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14; pt. 2, at 11.
129. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (“The purpose of Title I of the Bill is to make
available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug procedure for pioneer
drugs first approved after 1962.”).
130. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GENERIC DRUGS: QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm
100100.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (According to the FDA, “[a]lthough generic drugs
are chemically identical to their branded counterparts, they are typically sold at substantial
discounts from the branded price.”).
131. Avery, supra note 38, at 179 n.56 (“For example, when generic Prozac
(Fluoxetine) entered the market, the first generic challenger sold it at $1.91/capsule, or
12% below the cost of brand-name Prozac. Two months after the exclusivity period
expired, multiple generics had entered the market and the price of generic Prozac had
dropped to $0.32/capsule.”).
132. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1; Kurt R. Karst, PLAIRs–
What are They and What are FDA’s Current Policies?, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 11, 2010),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/04/plairs-what-are-they-andwhat-are-fdas-current-policies.html.
133. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
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exchange for assuming the costs and the risks associated with
134
litigation.
In Sanofi v. Apotex, Apotex was the first applicant to file an
ANDA with Paragraph IV certification, and therefore secured the
135
180-day exclusivity period. However, Apotex lost in litigation, lost
the exclusivity period, and was enjoined from importing generic
136
Plavix until the expiration of Sanofi’s patent. In contrast, Apotex’s
competitors were able to import and stockpile their products prior to
137
patent expiry via the PLAIR program.
Consequently, these other
generic manufacturers were ready and able to ship generic Plavix to
138
their customers the minute Sanofi’s patent expired. Apotex argued
that it would not be able to compete in the marketplace against its
competitors because by being delayed in market launch by even a
single day, it risked losing profits forever because it would not be able
139
to match the delivery schedules of its competitors.
While this result for Apotex was legally correct, it was also
contrary to the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act to encourage generic
manufactures to bring more of their products to the market. By
challenging Sanofi’s patents, Apotex assumed the costs and risks
associated with litigation. However, just because Apotex lost in
litigation does not mean that it should be placed at a competitive
disadvantage compared to later filing applicants who did not face the
costs and the risks associated with litigation. But this is precisely
140
what occurred in Sanofi v. Apotex. After Sanofi successfully sued
Apotex for patent infringement, Apotex converted its Paragraph IV
certification to a Paragraph III certification, in which it certified it
would not launch its generic product until after Sanofi’s patent
141
expired. Apotex was able to manufacture its generic product in a

134. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Representative Henry Waxman, Speech at the
Generic Pharmaceutical Association’s First Annual Policy Conference: Securing the Future
of Affordable Medicine (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/
news_files/news_statements_generic_pharmaceutical%20_association_9.20.05.htm.
135. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
136. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4); Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 397; SanofiSynthelabo, 550 F.3d at 1090.
137. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, 5 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02cv-02255-SHS (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2012).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5-6.
140. Id. at 3, 5.
141. Letter from Keith Webber, Deputy Director, Office of Pharmaceutical Science,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Kiran Krishnan, Director, North American
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foreign country prior to the expiry of Sanofi’s patent, but it was not
142
Apotex’s
able to import this product into the United Sates.
competitors were not similarly restrained. Consequently, even
though there was effectively no difference between Apotex and its
competitors—no one was going to launch a generic prior to the
expiration of Sanofi’s exclusivity period—Apotex was placed at a
competitive disadvantage merely for taking the risk of filing the first
Paragraph IV challenge. This should not be the result. Instead,
keeping with the intent of Hatch-Waxman, Apotex should have been
permitted to take advantage of its approved PLAIR request to
expedite its product launch.
5.2. Title II and Incentivizing Research and Development by
Brand-Name Manufacturers

The intent of the second part of Hatch-Waxman, the Patent
Term Restoration Act, is to induce brand-name companies to make
the investments necessary to research and to develop new drugs by
restoring some of the patent term lost during the FDA approval
143
process. Title II permits the extension of the term of a patent for a
definite period of time provided that certain requirements are met,
where this period of time is primarily based on marketing delays
144
created while the product is awaiting FDA approval. Congress was
explicit that the extension of the patent term should be a definite
period of time with no other direct or indirect method of extending
patent term, and thereafter, immediate competition should be
145
encouraged.
For that reason, Title I, the Drug Price Competition
Act, permits the filing and tentative approval of ANDAs before
Regulatory Affairs, Apotex Corp. (May 12, 2012) (on file with the Food and Drug
Administration).
142. 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(4)(b) (emphasis added) (“For an act of infringement . . .
injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent the commercial
manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation into the
United States of an approved drug, veterinary biological product, or biological
product. . . .”).
143. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 11 (“Title II of the Bill encourages drug
manufacturers to assume the increased costs of research and development of certain
products which are subject to premarketing clearance by restoring some of the time lost on
patent life while the product is awaiting FDA approval.”).
144. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46.
145. Id. (“Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to
grant exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time. That limited time should be a
definite time, and thereafter, immediate competition should be encouraged. For that
reason, Title I of the Bill permits the filing of Abbreviated New Drug Applications before
a patent expires and contemplates that the effective approval date will be the expiration
date of the valid patent covering the original product.”).
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patent expiration, and contemplates that the effective approval date
146
In practice, there
will be the expiration date of the valid patent.
should be no lag between patent expiration and competition, and the
generic drug should be able to enter the market the minute after the
brand-name manufacturer’s patent expires. But if the first applicant
to file an ANDA with Paragraph IV certification loses in litigation,
pursuant to section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act, it can be enjoined
from importing its generic product into the United States before
147
patent expiration, causing such a lag.
This is precisely what
happened in Sanofi v. Apotex. Sanofi’s marketing exclusivity expired
on May 16, 2012 and Apotex’s competitors were able to start shipping
148
their generic products to customers at 12:01 a.m. on May 17.
However, this result is contrary to the intent of the HatchWaxman Act. By delaying importation of generic drugs until after
patent expiration, section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act effectively
grants a de facto patent term extension, which is in direct conflict with
Congress’ explicit intent to allow generic competition immediately
after patent expiration.
PLAIR allows generic companies to
warehouse their drugs in the United States prior to FDA approval so
that they can expedite their market launches once they receive final
approval from the Agency. The PLAIR program aligns with the
intent of Title II by ensuring that there is immediate competition
after patent expiration. Thus, from a policy standpoint, Apotex
arguably should have been permitted to take advantage of its
approved PLAIR request.

6. Solutions to the Conflict Between the PLAIR Program and
Hatch-Waxman and Guidance for Practitioners
Although PLAIR does not conflict with the goals of the HatchWaxman Act, and regardless of whether the FDA chooses to exercise
enforcement discretion to not prosecute a violation of the FDCA, the
Agency has no power to abrogate the statutory mandates of HatchWaxman. Under the current laws, pharmaceutical patent holders
should be able to use permanent injunctions to prevent any
importation prior to patent expiration, including preapproval
importations via PLAIR requests. Ultimately, whether to allow
146. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46 (emphasis added). Note that this aligns with
the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to grant
exclusive rights to inventors “for limited times.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, clause 8.
147. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).
148. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, 5 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:02cv-02255-SHS.
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generic companies to take advantage of PLAIR despite the conflict
with Hatch-Waxman comes down to a policy choice that is up to
Congress to make—it must choose whether to protect the patent
rights of innovators or to speed generic drug competition.
6.1. Protecting Patent Rights

As discussed in Part 3, the FDA’s enforcement discretion does
not give the Agency the power to override injunctions under section
271(e)(4) of the Patent Act that prohibit importation of a generic
drug. To ensure that the FDA does not approve PLAIR requests
during the term of a patent injunction, the FDA should amend the
PLAIR process so that an applicant is required to submit information
identifying any injunctions that may prohibit importation of its
product. For example, the FDA could amend the PLAIR Draft
149
Guidance to require the following be included with all PLAIR
requests:
(j) A letter signed by an authorized representative of the
applicant certifying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that the applicant is
not a party to a court order subject to an injunction prohibiting
importation of the drug product.
This requirement will save both the FDA and the courts
resources. Such a requirement would allow the FDA to reject
PLAIR requests that seek to illegally import products during the term
of an injunction (or to summarily deny such requests if they fail to
submit this required information). In turn, this would prevent courts
from having to weigh in on whether importation under the PLAIR
request is proper.
Requiring PLAIR applicants to notify the FDA of injunctions
prohibiting importation of their product would avoid the issue raised
in Sanofi v. Apotex, where the FDA has approved Apotex’s PLAIR
request without considering the permanent injunction against Apotex
that prohibited importation before the expiration of Sanofi’s patent.
The conflict between PLAIR and Hatch-Waxman is a waste of
resources for both the FDA and the courts, and revision of the
PLAIR process is necessary.
6.2. Accomplishing the Intent of Hatch-Waxman

Given that PLAIR accomplishes the intent of Hatch-Waxman,
one solution to resolving the conflict between them is to incorporate
language into the Hatch-Waxman Act permitting PLAIR-based

149. FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2 at 2-4.
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importation. Congress could revise section 271(e)(4) of the Patent
Act with an amendment of subsection (B), adding similar language to
the underlined text below:
For an act of infringement [caused by filing an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification]
(A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of
the drug . . . to be a date which is not earlier than the date of
the expiration of the patent which has been infringed,
(B) injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to
prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale
within the United States or importation into the United States
of an approved drug, veterinary biological product, or biological
product, except importation into the United States shall be
allowable to the extent that such importation is permitted by the
Food and Drug Administration pursuant to a Pre-launch
150
Activities Importation Request.
Such an amendment to subsection (B) would allow generic
companies to import their products during the term of an injunction,
while still prohibiting them from actually marketing their products
until the brand-name manufacturer’s patent expires, thereby
protecting the pioneer’s patent rights. Furthermore, section 271(e)(4)
could be further amended to only allow importation if the PLAIR
applicant submits a letter signed by an authorized representative
certifying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that it will not sell, offer to sell, or
distribute its product prior to receiving final marketing approval from
151
the FDA.
Requiring such a letter would ensure that PLAIR still
prohibits pharmaceutical companies from marketing new drugs
without actual FDA approval, so that even if a drug has been
imported, the public is still protected from consuming potentially
unsafe or ineffective drugs.

7. Strategic Considerations for Practitioners
Until Congress or the FDA acts, practitioners are left with
flawed statutory and regulatory schemes. If a district court issues a
permanent injunction pursuant to section 271(e)(4) of the Patent Act
to prohibit the generic company from importing its infringing drug
product before the date that the patent expires, then the generic
should not be able to take advantage of PLAIR to import its generic
drug into the United States ahead of anticipated ANDA approval.
The following sections discuss strategic considerations and
150. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (emphasis added).
151. This would codify one of the current requirements for submitting PLAIR
requests. See FDA, PLAIR DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 2 at 3-4.
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precautions for lawyers representing both generic manufacturers
filing PLAIR requests and brand-name manufacturers seeking to stop
preapproval importation of generics.
7.1. Guidance for Generic Companies

In order for a generic company to take advantage of the
PLAIR program, it may wish to avoid the possibility of being
enjoined under section 271 (e)(4) by filing its ANDA with a
Paragraph III certification rather than a Paragraph IV certification.
Since filing a Paragraph III certification is not an act of patent
infringement, the pioneer will not be able to sue the ANDA applicant
152
to seek an injunction.
Of course, the disadvantage of filing a
Paragraph III certification is the generic applicant must wait until the
pioneer’s patent expires to enter the market, but this may be a moot
point in certain cases.
For example, the first generic company to file an ANDA will
likely include a Paragraph IV certification in order to secure the 180153
day exclusivity period. However, if during litigation it appears that
the pioneer may prevail in proving both validity and infringement of
its patent, the first filer may want to amend its Paragraph IV
certification to a Paragraph III certification before the court can rule
and issue an injunction. While this will cause the first filer to forfeit
154
its 180-day exclusivity period, it will also prevent the first filer from
being enjoined from importing infringing product during the patent
155
term. In this case, the generic challenger will not be able to enter
the market until the pioneer’s patent expires, but this is no different
from if the generic lost in litigation and was enjoined. But by
switching over to a Paragraph III certification before a court can issue
an injunction, the generic manufacturer will preserve its ability to use
the PLAIR program to import finished drug product prior to patent
156
expiry, allowing it to launch immediately thereafter.
This strategy may also be useful for later ANDA filers. The
first ANDA filer will typically enter into a reverse-payment
settlement with the pioneer, where it agrees to delay marketing its
generic product (typically until several months before the patent

152. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
154. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(III); see also Avery, supra note 38, at 186.
155. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
156. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, 5, Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No.
1:02-cv-02255-SHS.
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157

expires).
This means that any later filers will be prevented from
entering the market until the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period
runs, which may be no sooner than the expiration of the pioneer’s
158
patent.
If the later ANDA filer includes a Paragraph IV
certification, it will pointlessly risk an infringement suit and a possible
injunction with little chance of entering the market before the first
filer’s exclusivity period is over. Since an injunction would prevent
the later filer from utilizing the benefits of the PLAIR program, it
may be advantageous for the later filer to simply file a Paragraph III
certification from the start.
7.2. Guidance for Brand-Name Companies

In order for a brand-name company to prevent a generic
manufacturer from using the PLAIR program to import finished drug
product prior to the expiration of its patents, the pioneer must prevail
in showing both validity and infringement of its patents, and then
successfully secure an injunction barring the generic manufacturer
from importing its product during the term of the patent.
Furthermore, the pioneer should ensure that the injunction bars all
importation into the United States, with no exceptions for PLAIRbased importations.
If the pioneer becomes aware of a PLAIR request filed by a
generic challenger that has been previously enjoined under section
271(e)(4), the pioneer may consider filing a citizen petition with the
159
FDA requesting that it deny the PLAIR request. In such a petition,
the pioneer should inform the FDA of the injunction and argue that
the FDA should deny the PLAIR request because the Agency does
not have the authority to contravene the injunction by authorizing
importation of the generic product prior to patent expiry.
Alternatively, the pioneer may wish to be more aggressive and sue
the FDA directly, seeking to enjoin the Agency from approving the
PLAIR request. While the authors are not aware of any such
petitions or lawsuits, these strategies may allow a pharmaceutical
patent holder to stop the FDA from approving a PLAIR request and
prevent any importation prior to the expiration of its patents.

157. Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock to Generic Drugs: Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-9 (2013).
158. Id. at 10-11.
159. See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen
Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 122-23 (2013).
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Conclusion
A conflict arises between the PLAIR program and the HatchWaxman Act when the FDA allows preapproval importation
notwithstanding an injunction against a generic manufacturer
prohibiting such importation. While the FDA has the authority to
regulate the importation of drugs into the United States and the right
to allow preapproval importation via the PLAIR program, it does not
have the authority to abrogate patent injunctions issued under section
271(e)(4) of the Patent Act (which was added as part of the HatchWaxman amendments).
Nevertheless, the PLAIR program does not conflict with the
objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act of facilitating generic market
entry while preserving incentives for pioneer’s to develop innovative
new products. Under the current laws, pharmaceutical patent holders
should be able to use permanent injunctions to prevent any
importation prior to patent expiration, including preapproval
importations via PLAIR requests. However, if Congress decides that
speeding generic competition is more important than protecting the
patent rights of pioneers, then it could resolve this conflict by
amending section 271(e)(4) to include language permitting PLAIRbased importations. In the meantime, the FDA should amend the
requirements of PLAIR requests so that applicants are required to
notify the FDA of any injunctions prohibiting importation of their
products. Doing so would help the Agency to avoid violating the
patent rights of pioneers and approving illegal importations.

